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This article analyses the range of measures enacted by Portuguese diplomacy and the 
political police force to prevent the arrival of refugees, whether from Germany or other 
Nazi occupied countries. While, up until November 1938, German citizens, including 
German Jews, were free to enter the country for a period of up to 30 days, the outbreak 
of World War Two brought about a series of restrictions enacted with but one objective: 
keep Jewish refugees out of Portugal. Based on the case of two sisters, Flora and Bela 
Rothschild, this article approaches the true significance of these restrictions through 




O presente artigo analisa as várias medidas tomadas pela diplomacia e polícia política 
portuguesa para impedir a entrada de refugiados provenientes da Alemanha e dos países 
ocupados pelo exército nazi. Enquanto que, até novembro de 1938, qualquer cidadão 
alemão, incluindo judeus de nacionalidade alemã, poderia entrar no país livremente e 
ficar por 30 dias, o início da Segunda Guerra Mundial provoca uma série de restrições 
que visavam um objectivo único: manter Portugal livre de refugiados judeus. A partir 
do caso das duas irmãs Flora e Bela Rothschild, este artigo confronta-nos com o 
verdadeiro significado dessas restrições, mostrando os efeitos de uma política 
puramente legalista sobre a vida do ser humano. 
 
 
Nazi Germany's policy of forced emigration 
 
After Adolf Hitler's seizure of power on 30th January 1933, "the only thing a Jew could 
not choose was not to be a Jew" as Jacob Boas (1986, p.244) points out. Overnight, anti-
Semitism and anti-Judaism, two currents had lain latent in the German soil for decades, 
became the political manifesto of a totalitarian regime, which correspondingly sought to 
uproot all Jews from German society. 
In the first year after Machtergreifung, 63,400 out of the estimated total of 561,000 
Jews living in Germany in 19331 fled to countries neighbouring the Reich, in particular 
to France, the Netherlands, Poland, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland but also to 
Scandinavia or Britain. In subsequent years, however, this number would fall back to an 
annual average of about 35,000 people. 
While the exodus of Jewish citizens in this period met the interests of the Nazi regime, 
the same did not apply to their possessions and belongings. As the later President of the 
Jewish Community of Lisbon, Augusto d'Esaguy, explained to the Portuguese reader in 
his book Europe 39, how a German Jew who possessed 200,000 Reichsmark and 
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1 statistik-des-holocaust.de [ed.]. Jährliche Entwicklung der jüdischen Bevölkerung in Deutschland, 1933-
1945, 2017. [online] Avaliable at: <http://www.statistik-des-holocaust.de/stat_ger_pop.html>. [Accessed 
15 January 2017].  
decided to leave Germany, was able to only take 600 Reichsmark, something 
approximately like 0.3% of his/her assets (d’Esaguy, 1940)2.  
 
The new constellation following the annexation of Austria 
 
The annexation of Austria on March 13, 1938 was not only the first major success in 
Nazi Germany’s new foreign policy but also initiated a new turn on the road that would 
lead to the death camps. The entry of German troops triggered an immediate hunt for 
Austrian Jews with a degree of violence unprecedented in Nazi Germany itself (Safrian, 
1995, p.30). The German writer Carl Zuckmayer remembers this day in his memoirs: 
 
"Hell began this night. The kingdom of darkness opened its gates and loosed its 
load, most horrendous and disgusting ghosts. The city became like one of the 
nightmarish paintings of Hieronymus Bosch (...). And all the people lost their 
features, resembled distorted faces: some with fear, others with lies, others in the 
wild, full triumph of anger" (Zuckmayer, 1976, p.69). 
 
Jews living in Austria had only two options left: death or flight. There are many and 
numerous records of an avalanche of suicides. As a matter of fact, the international 
press then referred to a number of about 200 a day - while between 45,000 and 50,000 
people, about 25% of all Austrian Jews (Simpson, 1939, p.29)3, emigrated during the 
seven months following the German invasion, a phenomenon commented on 
sarcastically by Joseph Goebbels in his diary entry for March 13, 1938: "The Jews 
mostly fled. Where? Being eternal Jews to nowhere" (Goebbels, 1999, p.1216) . 
What Goebbels does not write in his diaries is that anyone who managed to flee Austria 
was deprived of their entire range of possessions, left totally dependent on the help of 
others, ie. a position that made them simply undesirable to all bordering countries. 
Despite the wave of sympathy that accompanied the new victims of Nazi Terror in 
London, Paris, or Prague, there were also growing concerns in neighboring countries 
over a mass of new immigrants, impoverished and difficult to socially integrate, that 
might could flood and overwhelm their labor markets. 
Eleven days after the entry of German troops into Austria, U.S. President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt suggested organizing an international conference focused on facilitating the 
emigration of refugees from territories under German administration. In hindsight, the 
conference proposed by Roosevelt and held at Évian-les-Bains, France from July 6 to 
15 was a complete failure. No participating state government proved willing to actually 
help shielded behind arguments around how their economic and social situation would 
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2 About the financial situation of the Jews also see the report of the Portuguese diplomat Denis Fernandes 
1940. O Problema dos Refugiados. Relatório elaborado pelo Consultor Económico do MNE Denis 
Fernandes, 28 Jan. Fundo Colecção de Relatórios. Lisbon: Arquivo Histórico do Ministério dos Negócios 
Estrangeiros (AHMNE)). Fernandes says in his 1940 report that the first Jewish refugees were allowed to 
take 75% of their possessions, a value that was gradually reduced over the next few years, until in 1937, 
those leaving Germany could take only around 10%, while the rest was withheld in the form of blocked 
funds, and in practice lost. Of great interest is in this context the passage taken from Breslauer Tagebuch 
written by Walter Tausk quoted in Aly and Heim (1997, p.29). Tausk illustrates the serious problem 
caused by the low external value of the Reichsmark which was only 8% of its nominal value. 
Consequently, the amount of money people needed to be allowed to enter countries such as Kenya, which 
was 50 £ ie 650 Reichsmark, buying the currencies within Germany, would increase up to 5,200 
Reichsmark when currencies were bought outside of Germany.  
3 In June 1939, Norman Bentwich estimated the number of Jews resident in Austria at 90,000, of whom 
only 1,000 did not reside in Vienna. After the annexation, according to the same source, about 10,000 
died, were killed or committed suicide (Simpson, 1939, p.29). 
not allow for any increase in their immigration quota. Indeed, the greatest concern for 
the participating states did not revolve around receiving more refugees but rather 
finding a way to move on those already in their territories (ICE, 1999, p.40). 
 
The pogroms of November 1938 
 
The pogroms of November 1938 marked the turning point in a policy evolving from 
forced migration to the physical destruction of the Jews. While the most visible 
consequences of the night from 9 to 10 November stemmed from the destruction of 250 
synagogues and thousands of Jewish-owned shops, less visible, but much more 
important to understanding the nature of these events, is the sheer number of people 
killed during those November days.  
While an internal NSDAP report registered the occurrence of 91 murders, police records 
document a high number of rapes and suicides in the aftermath of the violence4. 
Additionally, about 30,000 Jews were "arrested" in the wake of November 10th. While 
10.911 were sent to Dachau Concentration Camp, 9,828 to Buchenwald and about 6,000 
to Sachsenhausen (Wachsmann, 2015, p. 678). While some were shot shortly after their 
arrival at the camps, others died during escape attempts or due to the rigors of forced 
labour in these camps.  
For our context, it is important to point out that, Jewish inmates then imprisoned 
exclusively for racial motives would be allowed to leave the camps whenever able to 
present an entry visa to any country. Deprived of all their belongings and faced with the 
equally terrifying alternative of either starvation or being sent to a concentration camp, 
the exodus of German Jews exploded from 25,500 (1937) to 49,001 (1938) and 68,000 
(1939). 5 The new exodus from Germany made it more than clear that the mechanisms 
developed over the previous five years, i.e. individual, well-planned departures from 
Germany, firstly to neighbouring countries and subsequently to countries overseas, had 
become insufficient to deal with this new situation Arguing that their capacity to absorb 
refugees had become exhausted, governments began closing their borders to new 
refugees, limiting the stay of those who entered already to a certain timeframe, imposed 
severe labour restrictions on refugees or sent those who entered illegally to internment 
camps. In early 1939, of all the places in the world, there remained only one that 
allowed Jews entry without the requirement of a visa or residence permit: Shanghai 
(Simpson, 1939, p.47). 
 
What was the Portuguese government's position on these tragic events unfurling in 
central Europe? 
As regards the international community, the Portuguese government repeatedly 
maintained the position that there was no refugee problem in Portugal. Indeed, until 
1935, the Portuguese state did not differentiate between a refugee and a "normal" 
foreigner, provided that they had entered the country legally and were in possession of 
valid documentation6. However, unlike refugees from Germany, a country with which 
the Portuguese government had signed a visa waiver agreement, nationals from other 
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4 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. Holocaust Encyclopedia: Kristallnacht. [online] Avaliable 
at:  <https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005201> [Accessed 20 January 2017}. 
5 statistik-des-holocaust.de [ed.], Jährliche Entwicklung der jüdischen Bevölkerung in Deutschland, 1933-
1945. Op. cit.  
6 See Andrade, F. de, 1935. Letter dated 23 Oct.. 3 P, A28, M49: “REFUGIADOS”. Folder: Office 
Internacional NANSEN, Passaportes e títulos de identificação dos refugiados. Expulsões destes. 10/1935. 
Lisbon: AHMNE. “REFUGIADOS”.   
countries seeking to enter the country required a visa issued by the Portuguese 
authorities. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior had already 
agreed, in 1934, to make the granting of visas to "Polish Jews" dependent on prior 
consultation with the Political Police (PVDE) in order to "prevent the invasion of Polish 
Jews being felt in Portugal"7. Thus, even by April 1934, i.e. five years before the 
outbreak of WW2 war, Portugal had already introduced "racial and religious 
segregation" (Fralon, 1999, p.43) regarding foreigners wishing to reside in the country. 
Over the following years, the policy adopted by the Portuguese authorities had only one 
goal: to limit to the greatest possible extent the entrance of those foreigners who might 
eventually not be able to leave the country again.  
In fact, only one year later, the rules applied to the entry of Polish Jews were extended:  
firstly, to stateless persons, –a group of people the ministry officials designated by the 
German term “heimatlose”,– and those whose documentation had been issued by 
authorities other than those of their country of origin; secondly, to holders of  Nansen 
and Russian passports  (23/07/1935)8.  
An important step in further restricting the entrance of foreigners into Portugal came 
with the issuing of Circular no. 1, dated 24 March 1936. In this document, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs informed its consular posts that the granting of entry and residence 
visas for "Polish, heimatlos and others" had fallen under the exclusive responsibility of 
the Ministry of the Interior, ie. the Portuguese political police, the PVDE - the Police of 
State Surveillance and Defense. While at the outset even this group of people could 
theoretically still reside in Portugal, this scope was eliminated six months later when, on 
September 24, 1936, the consular posts were informed that henceforth such persons 
were only able to enter the country as tourists, thus only for a limited period of 30 days. 
Furthermore, the consuls were no longer entitled to issue visas without the prior 
consultation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while the extension of these visas had to 
be decided by the PVDE9. 
The analysis of these Circulars reveals how the PVDE was then closely monitoring the 
competences assigned to it under article 4 of the founding decree-law, specifically: 
"Preventing undocumented or undesirable aliens from entering the country"10 . And 
such undesirables included, from the perspective of its leadership, in addition to 
political refugees, all persons characterized by sharing the same common trait: being of 
Jewish origin. 
However, Circular No. 8 did not prove able to put an end to the continued entry of 
German Jews into Portugal who, while in possession of valid German documentation, 
could enter and settle in the country or, when no longer having this documentation, 
could still enter as tourists. Just over a week after issuing the aforementioned circular, 
the PVDE secretary-general José Catela accused the Foreign Ministry that German 
nationals, whose passports were either expired or expired within a few days of their 
arrival, would “frequently" enter Portugal. As the German consulate refused to renew 
these documents, their holders became undocumented and therefore had to be expelled 
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7 See Chalante (2011) on the Portuguese legislation regarding polish Jews. 
8 Handwritten note on the margin of a letter from the Portuguese Foreign Ministry dated 23/7/1935. 
M358, L18, C37. Secretaria Geral, Ministério do Interior. Lisbon: Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo 
(ANTT). See also Faria, J. A. de, 1935. Letter to the Secretary General of the Ministry of the Interior, 17 
Sep. M477 (1935). Gabinete do Ministro, Ministério do Interior. Lisbon: ANTT.  
9 See circular no. 8, dated 9/24/1936, as well as the letter from Sampayo, Luiz de, 1936.  Letter to the 
director of PVDE, 10 June, in which he communicates the contents of the new circular. 3P, A13-A, M98 
"Passaportes para a Metrópole, passaportes fraudulentos". Lisbon: AHMNE. 
10 Decree-law no. 22:992, dated  29/08/1933. In Diário do Governo, Ist Series, no. 195.   
 
by the PVDE at the expense of the Portuguese State. It does not prove surprising that 
the victims of the Consulate's refusals were "only Jews." Catela announced in his 
official letter that “Given the difficulty of distinguishing the German Jew from the 
rest",, henceforth, "the entry of Germans with expired passports will not be allowed 
under any circumstances, and Germans in general will only be allowed to stay in 
Portugal as tourists for as long as their passports are valid, and will not be issued a 
permanent residence permit, without presenting the certificate of consular 
registration”11. 
Catela’s letter initiated a new era in the relationship between the political police and the 
Foreign Ministry. From this moment onwards, the PVDE became the sole deciding 
entity in the admission of foreigners into Portugal. All restrictive measures decreed by 
the Foreign Ministry over the following years, were nothing other than attempts to 
formally legalize administrative acts already put into practice by the political police, 
when dealing with persons of Jewish descent.  
At the heart of the Portuguese dilemma resided the 1929 German-Portuguese visa 
suppression agreement, which stipulated that residents of both nations did not require 
visas when travelling to the other country. As a matter of fact, it was the introduction of 
the "J" stamp on the passports of German Jews (October, 5th, 1938) that would allow the 
Portuguese government to finally broaden the existing restrictions regarding foreign 
Jews to German nationals without suspending the existing bilateral agreement. Still 
furthermore in the same month (on October 28th, 1938), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
issued Circular No. 10, which stipulated in relation to Jewish immigrants "the 
establishment of migrants in Portugal is not allowed..."12 . Nevertheless, while the 
Circular forbade the residence of foreign Jews in Portugal, it continued to allow Jewish 
refugees to enter the country as tourists for a limited 30-day stay. One of the most 
interesting documents regarding Circular No. 10 is a letter by the Minister of the 
Portuguese delegation in Berlin, Alberto da Veiga Simões. The Portuguese diplomat 
criticized the restrictions as not adequate to the daily situation experienced by German 
Jews. Indeed, the explanation Veiga Simões found for the disproportionate nature of the 
restrictions and the German reality was the "distance" that separated the Lisbon 
Ministry from "the situation of the Jews here". Veiga Simões elaborated: 
 
"The conditions of poverty and daily humiliation to which they are deliberately 
subjected aggravated by a lack of humanity and rudeness which I do not know if 
truly Aryan but undoubtedly specifically Germanic, the insecurity of their own 
people, some imprisoned, others sent to concentration camps where rumours are 
coming that we were accustomed to read only in the chronicles of Russia, all this 
leads these thousands of persecuted, most of them on the run, to see as their 
salvation the possibility of going to another country for 30 days, for 8 days, for 24 
hours, as long as they can cross the border safe and sound ... From then onwards, 




11 Catela, José, 1936. Letter from the PVDE, 6 Oct., 2P, A43, M38, Processo, 36,1 “Vistos nos 
passaportes de indivíduos de nacionalidade mal definida (normas que regulam a entrada de indivíduos de 
determinadas origens (polacos, heimatlos e portadores de passaportes, emitidos por autoridades diferentes 
das do seu país de origem)”, Antigo Proc. 94, Data: 1936. Lisbon: AHMNE.  
12 Circular no. 10, dated 28 October 1938. Collection Telegramas Expedidas, bobine 125. Direcção-Geral 
dos Negócios Políticos e Económicos. Lisbon: AHMNE.  
13 Simões, Alberto da Veiga (1938). Letter no. 773 of the Head of the Portuguese Delegation in Berlin, 
Alberto da Veiga  Simões, 23 Nov., 2P, A43, M38. Lisbon: AHMNE.  
Despite these critical observations by Veiga Simões, the scope for seeking temporal 
shelter in Portugal had already been repeatedly sabotaged by the PVDE. In February 
1939, PVDE Captain Paul Cumano praised the work of his police force, which had 
prohibited the landing of German Jews in possession of valid tourist visas, concluding 
that due to their action “the stream of immigrants was stopped [...]"14. 
It should be noted, however, that there is consistency in the attitudes of the PVDE and 
the Foreign Ministry in relation to the policies pursued regarding Jewish refugees. Both 
did agree that everything should be done so that Portugal would not be considered a 
"country of refuge". As already mentioned, the restrictions applied by the PVDE were 
never targeting foreigners as a whole but only refugees who had left their native 
countries for racial or political reasons.  No statement better illustrates the stance of the 
agents of the Portuguese political police than the verdict of its director, Agostinho 
Lourenço, who emphasized in a letter sent a few days after the annexation of Austria: 
"Enough years of service in this police allow us to affirm that the foreign Jew, as a rule, 
is morally and politically undesirable"15. 
  
Further entrance restrictions following the outbreak of WW2  
 
One direct consequence of the conflagration of WW2 was the termination of the 
aforementioned visa waiver agreement [22]. Henceforth, all Germans wishing to travel 
to Portugal needed a consular visa. Over the following two years, the Foreign Ministry 
gradually tightened the already existing restrictions on entering Portugal still further.  
On 14 November 1939, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued Circular 14 that forbade 
its consular and diplomatic posts from any granting visas without prior consultation 
with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and PVDE to: 
a) aliens of indefinite nationality (stateless persons, holders of Nansen or Russian 
passports); 
b) foreigners without satisfactory reasons for coming to Portugal or whose passports 
would not allow them to return to the country from which they came; 
c) Jews expelled from the countries of their nationality or those from which they 
originated: 
d) people without a valid consular visa to enter the country of their final destination, or 
without a ship or plane ticket or embarkation guaranteed by the shipping company. 
 
At that time, however, the Ministry could never have foreseen the decision’s 
repercussions as, due to the apparently unstoppable advance of Nazi troops through 
neighboring countries, there were no longer hundreds but thousands of people applying 
for visas whose profile demanded a decision from Lisbon. Hence, this explains why, on 
May 12th 1940, i.e. ten days after the surrender of the Netherlands, the Ministry once 
more amended the existing regulation. The new directive demanded Consuls make a 
pre-selection of all visa applications, immediately rejecting all those without both a visa 
for the final destination country and a ticket for sea or air passage or a similar booking 
confirmation. Apart from that, and as a general rule, the consuls also had to dissuade all 
refugees from residing in Portugal, even temporarily, by facilitating only so-called 
transit visas limited to a stay of only 30 days. The Ministry’s purpose was clear: only 
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14 Cumano, Paul, 1939. Information attached to the letter of the PVDE, 7 Feb., 2P, A43, M38. Lisbon: 
AHMNE. 
15 Lourenço, Agostinho, 1938. Confidential letter from the PVDE, addressed to the Chief of the Office of 
the Minister of the Interior, 23 March. M495, C50. Ministério do Interior. Lisbon: ANTT.  
those people that gave more than sufficient guarantees they would quickly leave the 
country would be allowed to enter. 
The French defeat led Lisbon to impose further restrictions. On the day after the fall of 
Paris on 14 June 1940, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs applied still further restrictions 
on the consul scope for autonomous decision (Circular 23). Henceforth, Portuguese 
diplomats could only grant transit visas to refugees already in actual possession of a 
passage ticket to the destination country. Simultaneously, the consuls had to provide the 
PVDE with all the data regarding visa applicants. With the issuance of Circular 23, the 
Foreign Ministry abdicated its responsibilities over the issuing of visas in favor of the 
political police who definitively and officially became the key entity that decided who 
entered and who had to stay outside Portugal. This decision was reinforced six months 
later by a telegraph distributed order (16/12/1940), which removed the authority of 
diplomatic and consular agents for the granting of any kind of visa16 [25]. By 
centralizing visa issuing at the headquarters of the political police, the Portuguese 
government sought to ensure that cases such as Aristides de Sousa Mendes, the 
Portuguese consul in Bordeaux who helped thousands of refugees by handing them 
visas without any legal foundation, could never again happen.  
 
Case Study Flora and Bela Rothschild 
 
But what did it really mean to lack one single visa. One example that represents the 
literally thousands of refugees refused entry into Portugal I would like talk about is the 
tragic fate of two German sisters, Flora and Bela Rothschild17. At the end of 1939, both 
ladies applied for an entry visa for Rhodesia where they intended to join the rest of their 
family. The Rhodesian Police granted the request, ensuring both would receive the visa 
once they were in a neutral country. With this information, both women applied for a 
visa for Mozambique, the crossing point into Rhodesia. Furthermore, in December 
1939, the Immigration Police in Beira Mozambique notified the Portuguese Consul of 
Hamburg that the entry visas for Rhodesia were already in their hands. The Portuguese 
consul therefore informed Mrs. Bella Rothschild that for their departure from Nazi 
Germany they needed only the confirmation of their Portuguese visa by the Portuguese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry’s instruction to grant the visas, which arrived 
in Hamburg via telegraphic, however stated the condition that the passports had to 
already have the Rhodesian visa stamp, thus ignoring how these visas could not be 
received in Germany due to the war. Aware of this fact, the Foreign Ministry contacted 
its colony counterpart to ask for their opinion on the situation. In its reply (March 30, 
1940), the Ministry of Colonies stated that it had previously rejected a similar request 
concerning the same ladies considering that it was "inconvenient to comply with the 
claim". 
Surprisingly, on the border of this letter, there is an unreadable signature and a pencil 
written note asking: "Would it not be of advantage to consult the English or the people 
of Rhodesia?" That note conveys how the idea of rejecting the requests of Bela and 
Flora Rothschild did not get fully supported in the Foreign Ministry. However, on 4 
April 1940, the Ministry did send a telegram to the Hamburg consulate, which read as 
follows: "Visa Rothschild sister passports rejected." But the relatives did not give up 
and, by April 1940, the two ladies had already received their passports from the German 
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16 See the letter of December 16, 1940 annexed to the order of the Secretary General of the Portuguese 
Foreign Ministry, dated 13/6/1940. Arquivo R/C, M779. Lisbon: AHMNE.  
17 The case "Rothschild" is contained in a folder with the title: "Suspended for aggravation of the situation 
(to be seen when there is opportunity)”. Processo "Rothschild". 2P, A43, M80. Lisbon: AHMNE. 
authorities and had even already purchased their passages to Beira (Mozambique) on 
the ship "Lloyd Triestino". These are the latest details to be found in the archive of the 
Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The fact that the "Rothschild" case is filed in a 
folder entitled "Suspended due to worsened situation (for consideration when there is 
opportunity)” is no indication of a happy ending. Indeed, we find the names of both 
sisters in the Memorial Book18 edited by the German Federal Archive, which remembers 
the names of the 149,600 German Jews killed in the Holocaust. Flora and Bella 
Rothschild were both deported on 20 October 1941 from Frankfurt to the Lodz ghetto 
where Bella most probably died while her sister Flora was killed at the Kulmhof 




In the postwar period, Portugal repeatedly heaped praise upon itself as a country that 
had offered a safe haven to tens of thousands of Jewish refugees. Just one day after the 
unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany, António de Oliveira Salazar, the regime’s 
dictatorial leader, addressed the National Assembly on the Portuguese contribution to 
the Allied victory and summarizing Portuguese refugee policy as follows: 
"Anyone in our situation would welcome refugees, save and shelter shipwrecked 
people, help and soften the hardship of the prisoners, send donations to the needy, 
not only for the duty of human solidarity, but also to maintain in the world, though 
convulsed by mortal hatreds, what one could call, though tenuously, charity, 
prevision, and even, though pale, justice and peace. Too bad we could not do 
more20.” 
 
Our analysis of the politics pursued by the two central Portuguese government agencies 
dealing with Jewish refugees, the Portuguese Foreign Ministry and the Portuguese 
political police (PVDE) conveys how, very much contrary to Salazar’s statement, 
Portugal undoubtedly could indeed have done much more to assist the Jewish refugees. 
After all, those who did manage to overcome all the bureaucratic obstacles and succeed 
in entering the country legally constituted only a very small minority when compared to 
the numbers who failed and were consequently excluded and left utterly in the lurch.  
However, going to the extent of accusing Salazar and his government of having been an 
"involuntary accomplice to the genocide.", as a Portuguese Daily newspaper headline 
maintained several years ago (Diário de Noticias, 2012), for not having played an active 
role in saving the hundreds of thousands refugees stranded north of the Pyrenees, means 
completely ignoring the specific historic situation prevailing. Indeed, at the height of the 
refugee crisis, in the summer of 1940, the existence of Nazi concentration camps in 
occupied Europe was a known fact. However, no one could yet foresee either the later 
construction of the extermination camps or even imagine the tragic dimension of the 
holocaust. On the other hand, while the annexation of Austria and, later, the November 
pogroms in Germany, Austria and Sudetenland did trigger a wave of international 
solidarity, the atrocities suffered by the Jewish population in Germany and the 
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20 Extraordinary legislative session from 4 May to 6 July 1945. In Diário das Sessões, IIIª Legislatura, 
Índice Geral. Lisbon: National Assembly 1946, p. 469.  
territories under German administration did not lead the governments of neighboring 
countries to reduce or otherwise facilitate the existing entry restrictions. In fact, on the 
contrary as a brief overview of the refugee policies of three countries known for their 
tradition of generously granting asylum shall demonstrate.  
While, during the 1930s, France stood out as the key destination for German 
emigration, harboring a total of around 100,000 refugees21, the Daladier government, 
immediately after taking power in April 1938, passed several laws tightening the terms 
for refugees. Correspondingly, while those living in the country illegally, as well 
persons assisting them, were threatened either with a fine varying from 100 to 1000 
Francs or with imprisonment from one month up to one year, new refugees entering 
illegally were now deemed eligible for repatriation (Grynberg, 1999, p.33). A few 
weeks earlier (March 28, 1938), the Swiss Government had already introduced a visa 
for Austrian passport holders to reduce the inflow of Jewish refugees from Austria in 
the wake of the annexation. Only four months later (on August 19), the Swiss Federal 
Council passed a decree that stepped up border controls and led to the turning back of 
all refugees seeking to enter illicitly (ICE, 1999, pp.75-76). While in France and 
Switzerland, the incorporation of Austria led to much more restrictive refugee policies, 
in Great Britain, news about the Nazi atrocities during the Anschluss and the following 
November pogroms made the government loosen existing restrictions and also 
authorizing about 10,000 children from Nazi occupied territories to enter the country22. 
However, while the government was opening the borders of its own territory to the 
Kindertransporte, the British civil administration in Palestine was bending to the rules 
of Realpolitik. In the face of constant Arab uprisings in Palestine and fearing that losing 
the support of the neighbouring Arab states might jeopardize the lines of 
communication with India and the Far East, the British government reversed the Balfour 
Declaration with the publication of the so called White Paper (May 1939) and limited 
the immigration of Jews into Palestine to a maximum of 75,000 over a five year period 
(Wasserstein, 1999, p.18).   
However, what about the refugee policy of Portugal’s Peninsula neighbour?  The main 
difference between Spain under the dictatorship of Francisco Franco and Portugal under 
Salazar can be pinpointed to one historical aspect: their political proximity to Nazi 
Germany. While Franco opted for openly supporting the axis powers through a 
declaration of nonbelligerency, Portugal affirmed its neutrality towards all warring 
countries. Franco’s fascist regime, with the presence of Gestapo officers in Madrid and 
the poverty-stricken post-civil war country never appealed to the refugees fleeing 
Western Europe as many feared that they would be caught and extradited from Spain 
(Mühlen, 1992, p.85).  Although Salazar, exactly like Franco, feared the liberal spirit of 
these foreigners as a potential threat to the continued existence of his antidemocratic 
and antiparliamentarian regime, Portugal did still authorize the establishing of the main 
international Jewish organizations for the assistance of Jewish refugees on Portuguese 
soil (Milgram, 2010, p.371). However, even this decision only reflects the basic 
principle underlying the entire Portuguese refugee policy: Portugal never accepted 
being a country of refuge but rather only of transit and correspondingly allowing in only 
those able to guarantee that they would leave just as soon as possible.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Jüdisches Museum Berlin and Stiftung / Haus der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland [eds.], 
2006. Heimat und Exil. Emigration der Deutschen Juden nach 1933. Frankfurt: Jüdischer Verlag im 
Suhrkamp Verlag, p. 44.  
22 During the previous years, Britain only allowed scientists and female refugees, who were going to be 
employed as maids, to enter the country. On the topic of the emigration of Jewish women from Germany, 
see Kushner (2006, pp. 72-75). 
But with this policy, Portugal under Salazar behaved exactly like the (democratically 
elected) rulers of the entire world. And this probably embodies one of the most 
disturbing truths to the history of the Holocaust. Not one of the world’s leaders proved 
willing to step beyond national interests and actively contribute to an international 
evacuation plan for the Jews in the Nazi occupied territories. The failed international 
conference of Evian of July 1938, organized in the aftermath of the annexation of 
Austria, simply made it clear, not only to wider public opinion but also to the victims 
within Nazi Germany, that the world  “was not willing to provide any place to the Jews 
" (Jäckel, Longerich and Shoeps, 1993, p.427). 
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